

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events



Univ. of the South  
The Library  
Sequenee, Tenn.

LS-1

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION • INCORPORATED • 22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXX No. 15

JANUARY 19, 1951

## Will Congress Curtail U.S. Military Commitments?

WASHINGTON—A gauge of the effect of the present critical discussion of foreign policy will be available when the new Congress takes up the coming fiscal year's appropriation for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. This appropriation enables the United States to provide friendly powers abroad with arms and the raw materials needed for the production of armaments. If Herbert Hoover has seriously influenced Congress with his proposal that, under certain circumstances, the United States should pull back its frontier of operation from the center of Europe to the Straits of Dover, Congress either will authorize no funds for our continental European allies or will severely cut the amount requested by President Truman. If Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican of Ohio, has affected Congress by his complaint that the President is overreaching his authority by sending American troops abroad, Congress will curb the President by redefining his powers under the MDAP.

### Nature of the Controversy

On the major issues raised so far in the discussion, President Truman seems to be winning the day against his critics. Those major issues are: (1) Should we abandon Europe or carry forward the ramified set of policies built around the North Atlantic treaty?; (2) Does the President's constitutional position of Commander-in-chief give him authority to allocate American troops as he wishes? The discussion might become more enlightening if two corollary issues were brought up: (1) Is it not possible for the United States both to remain an active

participant in European affairs and at the same time soften the emphasis on the North Atlantic treaty policies?; (2) Is the question of the President's authority over the troops wholly a constitutional matter, or is it a question also of statutes and shifting attitudes among members of Congress? The major issues at the heart of the current discussion are so broad that they offer little opportunity for compromise between the President and his critics if the influence of the latter should grow; and in any event, the form in which they are now presented fails to educate the public in the intricacies of world policies to the degree that a penetrating discussion should do.

In his annual State of the Union message of January 8 President Truman replied to the Hoover and Taft suggestions. "The defense of Europe is the basis for the defense of the whole free world—ourselves included," he said. ". . . That is why we have joined with the countries of Europe in the North Atlantic treaty, pledging ourselves to work with them." Whereas Mr. Hoover on December 20 had proposed that we withdraw from continental Asia and use Japan as the advance base of our defense against attack from the Far East, President Truman declared: "If the free countries of Asia. . . should fall to Soviet Russia, we would lose the sources of many of our most vital raw materials. . . . Soviet command of the manpower of the free nations of Europe and Asia would confront us with military forces which we could never hope to equal. In such a situation the Soviet Union could impose its demands on the world without resort to conflict,

simply through the preponderance of its economic and military power. . . . It would be disastrous for us to withdraw from the community of free nations."

The message clarified the differences of opinion also between the President and Senator Taft. On January 5 Taft, in a speech to the Senate, castigated American assistance in the formation of a European army, criticizing the President's dispatch of troops to Korea as a "usurpation" of powers that rightly belong to Congress. Mr. Taft did not propose abandonment of Europe, but he accused the President of preparing "secretly" without consultation with Congress to send American troops in large numbers to the continent. The President in his message on the State of the Union took nothing back, saying, "We sent to Europe last week one of our greatest military commanders, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. . . . His mission is vital to our security." At his press conference on January 11 President Truman said that he had the legal right to send troops anywhere in the world, including Europe, when General Eisenhower notifies Washington how many Americans in uniform he needs.

### Trend of Opinion

President Truman has Democratic and Republican support in Congress for the general proposition that the United States should participate in the affairs of Europe through the North Atlantic policies. Chairman Tom Connally of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Democrat of Texas, on January 11 dismissed the Taft suggestion as "bargain-counter" security based on a "strength-through-weakness

Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association

philosophy." Republican Senator William F. Knowland of California on January 11 proposed that the United States send to Europe one military division for every six raised by our European allies, with a 70-division European army as the goal. Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge supported our military program in Europe and condemned discussion by some Senators of the possibility of using atomic bombs in Europe. "This does not make friends for us abroad, however much it may reassure people at home," Lodge said. The Senate Republican Committee on Committees on January 11 designated Senator Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire for membership on the Foreign Relations Committee (the post actively sought by Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Richard Nixon of California). Tobey has usually supported Administration policy.

In the past neither Congress nor the President has considered that congressional restrictions on presidential use of American armed forces is inescapably an instrument for isolation. In more than

100 instances the President has sent American troops into action abroad without by-your-leave to Congress, but Congress has at times assumed authority to prevent such dispatch of troops. The restrictions in the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1937 and 1939 were isolationist, but the United Nations Participation Act of December 20, 1945, limiting the privilege of the President to use American forces in support of UN decisions, was not isolationist. In stating on January 11 that he has authority to send troops abroad, President Truman said, nevertheless, that he would consult the appropriate congressional committees in advance of dispatching them. So the pending resolution by Representative Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., Republican of New York, to deny appropriations for troops sent abroad henceforth without specific congressional approval is not wholly revolutionary.

The controversy over official powers reflects in some degree the chronic suspicion of members of Congress that the Administration does not tell them everything candidly. In recommending ap-

roval of the North Atlantic treaty in 1949, for example, the Administration minimized suggestions that the treaty could be an effective instrument only if the United States posted its troops in Europe, encouraged Europeans to develop their armaments industry at the expense of efforts to restore civilian enterprise through the Marshall plan, and spent large sums on armaments for the benefit of our allies. Those developments, however, have actually taken place. The treaty was originally proposed as a measure to bolster the main edifice of our European policy—the effort to achieve economic recovery—but now it has become almost the whole of our European policy. Such changes were foreseen in 1949,\* but the reluctance of the Administration to point them out publicly at that time gives its critics a sense of righteousness in 1951.

BLAIR BOLLES

\*See Blair Bolles and Vera Micheles Dean, "North Atlantic Defense Pact," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XXIV, No. 19 (Feb. 15, 1949).

## Does Negotiation Offer Way Out of Global Crisis?

The new year has brought three proposals for conferences between non-Communist nations, on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other. On January 13 the United Nations delegations, by a vote of 50 to 8, approved a plan submitted by the three-man Truce Committee for holding a Far Eastern parley following a ceasefire in Korea. The Truce Committee's proposal, based on suggestions previously made by Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, includes a ceasefire in Korea; further steps to restore peace if a ceasefire occurs; withdrawal by stages of all non-Korean troops and arrangements to have the Korean people choose their own government; measures to establish an interim administration in Korea; and, finally, a conference on the Far East to include Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, which would discuss, among other topics, Formosa and Peiping's representation in the United Nations.

Meanwhile, the Big Four conference to be concerned primarily, although not exclusively, with Germany, proposed by Moscow on November 3, is still under consideration, although the United States views a meeting confined to German affairs with great pessimism. And on January 12 the nine countries represented at

the British Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London announced in a joint declaration that they would "welcome any feasible arrangement for a frank exchange of views" with Premier Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. "We should, in the name of common humanity, make a supreme effort to see clearly into each other's hearts and minds."

### Short of Appeasement?

These three proposals raise three major questions. First, does negotiation with Russia and China on any subject represent "appeasement," and would the results of negotiation, if favorable to the two Communist-ruled countries, be regarded as a reward of aggression and consequently as a defeat for the UN?

The Commonwealth nations answered this question by declaring that the problem of peace is, among other things, that "of being at all times willing to discuss our differences without foolishly assuming that all attempts to secure peace are a form of 'appeasement.'" It is true that, had Peiping refrained from resorting to arms in Korea, there would have been less willingness on the part of some of the UN members to proceed with discussions concerning the future of Korea and Formosa and the seating of Peiping in

the United Nations. To this extent, then, the participation of Communist China in a Far Eastern conference would represent a success for Peiping. Washington has indicated that its acceptance of the Truce Committee's "package" proposal was based on the expectation that Peiping would reject the ceasefire, necessary prelude to a conference. The way would then be cleared to have the majority of the UN members brand Communist China as an aggressor, even if the international organization, through lack of adequate military resources, should find it impossible to take collective action against the Chinese as it has done against the North Koreans.

Yet if all negotiations between non-Communist and Communist countries are to be rejected as "appeasement," the weapon of diplomacy will no longer be available to the members of the United Nations, and ultimate decision in every conflict involving one or more of the major powers will have to be left to the force of arms. This of itself would promote the idea of the "inevitability" of war and recurrently emphasize basic and genuine divergences of views among UN members as to the substance of major international disputes and the best method of adjusting them. As Walter Lipp-

mann pointed out on January 15, there is a real question as to whether the United Nations will serve the world best if it takes up arms in every case of conflict, or if it encourages and broadens the process of diplomatic negotiations among member nations.

### **What Is "Honorable"?**

The second question raised by the three conference proposals is, What would the United States—and other non-Communist nations—consider "honorable settlements," to quote the phrase used by President Truman in his State of the Union message? Would only such settlements that represented a setback for Russia and China be regarded as honorable—and if so, would they be rejected as "dishonorable" in Moscow and Peiping? Or would arrangements which take into account the existing balance of power in Europe and Asia be regarded as acceptable by the United States if they were judged acceptable by other nations more directly concerned because of their geographic position on these continents?

\* Let us leave aside for a moment the far-reaching ideological problems which would hardly be susceptible to definitive settlement by diplomatic conferences. Looking solely at the political realities, any settlement made today in Europe would have to recognize such factors as the return of Germany to a position of influence, the deep-seated desire of the Germans for national unity and the fear of German rearmament in France as well as in Eastern Europe. It would also have

to make allowances for the war-weariness of France and the desire of Europeans, from the British to the Yugoslavs, to create a "third force." Similarly, in Asia, any settlement made today would have to recognize such factors as the return of Japan to a position of influence and the reluctance of the Japanese to rearm for service abroad. It would have to take cognizance of the fear of another general war that prevails throughout Asia; the ultimate liquidation of the remnants of colonialism, including French Indo-China; and the consolidation of China under a strong central government.

The North Atlantic pact coalition, although lacking ground forces comparable to those at the disposal of Russia and China, retains a strong lead on sea and in the air and commands industrial resources superior to those of the Communist nations. Even if United Nations troops should have to evacuate Korea and abandon further thought of war on the Asian mainland, this would not mean, as some commentators have prematurely assumed, that Western prestige, and notably that of the United States, would thereby be reduced to zero. On the contrary, it is conceivable that the cessation of military hostilities might make non-Communist Asian countries, particularly India, more responsive to the possibilities of cooperation with the United States in trade, economic development and improvement of human welfare. But no settlement in Europe or Asia would have much hope of success if it were not based on the realities of the present situation.

Assuming that negotiation is not equated with "appeasement" and that settlements are reached which the United States and other members of the UN would regard as "honorable," a third question arises: Can non-Communists trust Communists? Professor Hans Kohn, in the *New School Bulletin* of January 15, contends that "peace with the present Communist Russia is impossible because there is no basis for understanding."

If this assumption is correct—if the ideological concepts of the Communist leaders in Moscow and Peiping preclude the kind of humanly fallible arrangements which were once negotiated by great powers at the conferences of Vienna and Paris, Portsmouth and Versailles—then, it might be asked, Are conferences necessary? Or should all doors to discussion be shut tight until such time as communism disintegrates through its own inner weaknesses? Professor Kohn, refusing to conclude that war is inevitable, believes that free men must convince "the Communist leaders both that their world designs are doomed to fail and that the free world will not open war upon them." The Commonwealth nations, judging by their declaration, take the view that continued exploration of the purposes of Russia and China through conferences are an essential feature of the process of convincing the Communists that the non-Communist countries, while arming themselves for possible contingencies, have no desire to use war as the only way out of the global crisis.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## **India's Voice Gains in Commonwealth Councils**

The meeting of the Commonwealth prime ministers in London from January 4 to 12 coincided significantly with United Nations efforts to bring about a truce in Korea, even at the price of eventual concessions to Communist China, and with the debate on the fundamentals of foreign policy going on in this country. When invitations to the conference were issued last November, the present gravity of the Korean situation was unforeseen, but the decisions of the Commonwealth leaders have been reached in the context of the Asian crisis. Moreover, they were proclaimed with full realization that Americans today, in the re-examination of their own policy, are surveying their allies, real and potential, with a critical eye.

The keynote of the declaration issued by the Commonwealth conference on

January 12 was negotiation. The voice of India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was dominant in certain parts of it, particularly in the statement: "The great antidote to war is hope: its greatest promoter is despair. . . . In a world worn out and distorted by war, there must be an overwhelming majority of the people of all lands who want peace. We must not despair of reaching them." The means proposed for this objective was the suggestion for some "arrangement for a frank exchange of views with Stalin or with Mao Tse-tung."

The lofty language of the declaration may have been inspired by New Delhi, but it was endorsed by all the participants of the meeting. Both British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent—the latter

regarded as the dominion spokesman closest to Washington's point of view—stressed their desire to prevent war. The sense of the conference was re-echoed at Lake Success where the truce proposal was framed by the Indian and Canadian delegates working with the Assembly President. Thus the Commonwealth proved itself effective in shaping UN policy.

### **Focus on the Far East**

The London declaration gives little indication that a great deal was accomplished in inter-Commonwealth affairs. The Kashmir dispute, which had delayed the arrival of Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, was discussed informally and inconclusively. The references to defense problems were vague; it

was reported that Mr. Nehru absented himself from sessions with military leaders when proposals for aligning responsibilities for security were considered.

The attention of the delegates was clearly focused on the dangers of general war in the Far East, and their declaration was written with both Moscow and Washington in mind. For Moscow there was notice of the peaceful intentions of the Commonwealth leaders, as well as a warning that "so long as the fear of aggression exists, we will have to strengthen our defenses with all speed and diligence." For Washington there was an appreciation of American efforts to aid war-stricken countries and an expression of intention to "arrive at common international policies with the United States." But there was also an implied message that American-Commonwealth cooperation depends upon an understanding in this country of what the Commonwealth represents.

### **U.S. and Commonwealth**

The delegates to the London meeting included the prime ministers of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The South African minister of interior, T. E. Donges, sat in for Prime Minister D. F. Malan, who is ill. Sir Godfrey Huggins, prime minister of the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, also attended, as he did in 1948. As at past conferences, the leaders exchanged views rather than engaged in the formulation of integrated policy. Nonetheless, their consultations are expected to carry weight in their respective capitals.

It was the boast of the conference's declaration that the Commonwealth comprises one-fourth the world's population and extends over all the continents and the oceans of the world. Since 1945 Britain's policy, with the approval and cooperation of the so-called older "white" dominions, has been ardently devoted to preventing the contraction of this vast area. The decisions of 1946 and 1947 to free India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma were made so that what was once Empire could become Commonwealth. Even the loss of Burma, which chose to stay outside the association, served this purpose, for it gave the three new Asian do-

minions proof of Britain's sincerity. The Commonwealth conference formula of April 1949 which stretched the definition of the Crown to allow India to become a republic and yet remain a member of a club for constitutional monarchies was more than a piece of legalistic quibbling; it was a symbol of the common desire to keep the Commonwealth intact. The program for economic assistance in Asia initiated at the Colombo meeting of foreign ministers a year ago had a similar aim.

Despite the fact that British, Canadian, New Zealand and Australian troops are in action against Chinese "volunteers" in Korea, the prime ministers in London appeared to move closer to the conviction that Communist China should be seated in the UN. Here again is notice that the Asian point of view has proved potent in the Commonwealth.

The British argue with conviction that in any showdown with the Soviet Union or even with China they will be on the side of the United States. But when and if the decision has to be made, they would like to carry the Asian dominions with them. And they believe this can be done only by proving clearly to New Delhi and Karachi that there is no other alternative. Britain would certainly consider the loss of India—either through neutrality or hostility—as disastrous as the loss of China from the ranks of nations friendly to the West. If Washington should ask all nations to choose sides before the resources of diplomacy are exhausted, the British fear that it would do more to split the Commonwealth than Moscow could accomplish in decades.

WILLIAM W. WADE

### **Branch and Affiliate Meetings**

PHILADELPHIA, January 19, *Capturing the Mind of Man*, Elmer Davis, Henry S. Commager

NEW YORK, January 22, *France and Today's Crisis*, Georges-Henri Martin

PITTSBURGH, January 22, *U.S. Relations with Latin America*, Edward G. Miller, Jr.

COLUMBUS, January 24, *Southeast Asia*, John Cady

CLEVELAND, January 26, 27, *World Affairs Institute*

NEW YORK, January 27, *Student Forum*, Emil Lengyel

DETROIT, January 30, *United Action for Peace*, Joseph E. Johnson

BUFFALO, February 1, *The Crisis in Asia*, John K. Fairbank

### **News in the Making**

MIDDLE EAST OIL TAXES: The Arabian American Oil Company agreed on January 2 to pay an income tax to the Saudi Arabian government of such magnitude as to share its net operating income equally with the government. The new profit-sharing arrangement has called attention to the resentment Middle Eastern nations feel toward the United States and Britain because of their steep levies on the oil companies. Iran, for example, complains that its income from oil is 33 cents a barrel, while Britain's tax yields that country 40 cents a barrel.

AMERICAN INTEREST IN NEW GUINEA QUARREL: Dutch-Indonesian negotiations concerning disputed West New Guinea, scheduled for termination by the end of 1950, broke off without an agreement having been reached. Exacerbated Indonesian sentiment is leading to boycott threats and demonstrations and could jeopardize the Dutch-Indonesian Union. The United States, which had hitherto held aloof from the discussions, on January 7 notified the two parties of its deep concern over the dispute.

RAW MATERIAL CONTROL: The United States, Britain and France acted on January 12 to end the costly scramble for strategic raw materials. The three nations will constitute a central control group to advise and coordinate a series of international commodity groups representing consuming and producing countries that have a "substantial interest" in particular items.

TRENDS IN TITOISM: The Cominform has been aiming its most poisonous darts at the Socialist parties, but Marshal Tito told a correspondent on January 13 that his government would collaborate with "all progressive parties" and "especially with the Socialist parties" provided such collaboration strengthened peace and was conducted on the basis of equality. A week earlier, in a copyrighted United Press story, the Marshal warned against rearming Western Germany and advocated another four-power conference with the Soviet Union, thus reflecting Eastern European anxiety lest a remilitarized Germany renew its historic *Drang nach Osten*.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXX, No. 15, JANUARY 19, 1951. Published weekly from September through May inclusive and biweekly during June, July and August by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMENY, President; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; WILLIAM W. WADE, Associate Editor. Re-entered as second-class matter June 4, 1948, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.